Boltz, the non-custodial bridge that routes Bitcoin between the mainchain, the Lightning Network, and Liquid, first announced its swap services were unavailable at 3:24 p.m. ET on Aug. 3. A d
Boltz, the non-custodial bridge that routes Bitcoin between the mainchain, the Lightning Network, and Liquid, first announced its swap services were unavailable at 3:24 p.m. ET on Aug. 3. A detailed explanation followed roughly six hours later, at 9:42 p.m. ET, when the team posted directly to X: “this is not a response to a single incident.” In the statement, Boltz said it has spent months watching automated, AI-assisted probing of its infrastructure escalate, and that the past few days alone brought “a drastic acceleration” it doesn’t expect to reverse. Swaps will stay down until further notice.
Boltz hasn’t specified which component of its infrastructure the attackers have been targeting, or what exploit method they’ve used. The statement describes a pattern of pressure, not a technical vector. There’s no on-chain trace to check here either, because, as the next section explains, none of this activity actually touched user funds.
- Aug. 1: Boltz disables EVM-side swaps (USDT, USDC, TBTC, WBTC, RBTC), citing a bug in its EVM integration; Lightning, Liquid, and onchain BTC swaps continue running normally.
- Aug. 3, 3:24 p.m. ET: Boltz announces swap services are unavailable.
- Aug. 3, 9:42 p.m. ET: Boltz posts a detailed statement disabling swaps indefinitely, citing monthslong AI-assisted attacks.
Why the Exploits Never Touched User Funds
Here’s the part of Boltz’s statement that matters most for anyone who’s used the service: despite “several exploits” over recent months, user money was never at risk. Boltz never takes custody of user funds. Its swaps run on cryptographic contracts that lock both sides of a trade to the same secret, so a swap either completes on both ends or fails on both ends, as Boltz co-founder Kilian has described the mechanism. An attacker getting further into Boltz’s own systems doesn’t create a lever to reach into a user’s wallet, because that lever doesn’t exist. That structural gap between “we were exploited” and “users lost nothing” is why Boltz can say that exploits were “contained” without that claim resting on trust in Boltz’s security team.
“Contained” here means the exploits never reached user assets, not that they failed to do anything at all. Whether they cost Boltz anything else is a separate question, addressed below.
Boltz Absorbed the Losses Itself
Boltz also said that, as a fully bootstrapped company, it absorbed the losses from the contained exploits rather than passing them on to users. The company did not disclose the amount. The shutdown also affects wallets that rely on Boltz’s infrastructure, including Bull Bitcoin and Aqua. While swap functionality is unavailable during the pause, Boltz’s non-custodial design means user funds remain under users’ control rather than the platform’s custody.
Samson Mow, CEO of JAN3, the company behind Aqua, said restoring Liquid and Lightning swaps is now the team’s top priority, and that Aqua has offered to help Boltz work through its infrastructure issues.
Boltz Ties Its Return to Its Own Security Review
Boltz’s own message to users is blunt: don’t expect swap services back soon. The team says it’s still reviewing its recent security scans and won’t re-enable swaps while it believes it remains targeted by multiple well-resourced attacker groups. Its refund API keeps processing existing swaps, and unilateral refunds work regardless of Boltz’s own infrastructure status; those two mechanisms are unaffected by the pause. Boltz says it won’t set a return date until it’s satisfied the threat has actually passed.