Aave’s risk manager LlamaRisk recommended raising borrow caps on five reserves across four Aave V3 instances, published on Aave’s governance forum on November 1, 2026 The changes include rais
- Aave’s risk manager LlamaRisk recommended raising borrow caps on five reserves across four Aave V3 instances, published on Aave’s governance forum on November 1, 2026
- The changes include raising WETH’s borrow cap on Aave V3 Core from 1,790,000 to 1,810,000 and on Aave V3 Prime from 16,100 to 17,000, after both reserves reached 99.4% and 100% utilization respectively
- The caps being raised had been cut on October 30, 2026 and stayed reduced even after the affected reserves were unfrozen later that same day
Aave’s risk management partner LlamaRisk posted a set of borrow cap increase recommendations to the protocol’s governance forum on November 1, 2026, covering five reserves spread across four separate Aave V3 deployments. The proposal follows the standard Risk Steward process the protocol uses to make incremental parameter adjustments without requiring a full governance vote for every change.
The five changes recommended are: raising WETH’s borrow cap on Aave V3 Core from 1,790,000 to 1,810,000, where utilization had reached 99.4% of the existing cap; raising EURC’s borrow cap on the same instance from 26,600,000 to 30,000,000, at 98.3% utilization; raising WETH’s borrow cap on Aave V3 Prime from 16,100 to 17,000, at full 100% utilization; raising USDT0’s borrow cap on Aave V3 Polygon from 22,200,000 to 23,000,000, at 98.3% utilization; and raising USD₮0’s borrow cap on Aave V3 X Layer from 30,300,000 to 35,000,000, also at 100% utilization. After the changes, LlamaRisk’s own figures show utilization easing to between roughly 86.6% and 94.9% across the five reserves.
What makes the timing notable is where these caps came from in the first place. LlamaRisk’s post states that the caps being raised now had been reduced on October 30, 2026, and that the lower caps stayed in effect even after the affected reserves were unfrozen later that same day, a reference to Aave’s broader response to the Binance security incident that unfolded on October 29 and 30. The post itself does not spell out the original reasoning for the October 30 reduction beyond pointing to a separate prior post describing it, but the sequence shows Aave tightening its risk parameters defensively during the incident and then gradually easing them back as normal borrowing demand pushed utilization back up against the lower ceilings.
Borrow caps serve as a safety limit on how much of a given asset can be borrowed against a lending pool at once, protecting against scenarios where a sudden surge in borrowing could leave the pool without enough liquidity for withdrawals or create outsized exposure to a single asset. Raising a cap only after utilization has climbed close to its ceiling is a cautious, demand-driven approach rather than a preemptive loosening of risk limits.
The move illustrates how Aave’s guardian and risk-steward systems continue to make frequent, incremental adjustments well after an initial crisis response, fine-tuning parameters as real usage patterns reassert themselves. The full recommendation is posted on Aave’s own governance forum.
This post first appeared in Aave Raises Borrow Caps on Five Markets After They Hit Full Capacity