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Altcoins

K3 Capital’s sBOLD Hack: $3.42M Drained in Eight Minutes

K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault lost about $3.42 million on November 18, and it lost all of it. The drain ran for eight minutes, from 12:25 to 12:33 UTC. By the end, the Ethereum savings vault that

AnonymousCryptoCompass newsroom
November 19, 2026
5 min read
NEWS
K3 Capital’s sBOLD Hack: $3.42M Drained in Eight Minutes
CryptoCompass editorial visual for altcoins coverage.

K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault lost about $3.42 million on November 18, and it lost all of it. The drain ran for eight minutes, from 12:25 to 12:33 UTC. By the end, the Ethereum savings vault that held depositors’ BOLD was empty.

Blockaid raised the alarm at 12:50 UTC, putting the loss at about $3.43 million across ~34 transactions and calling the exploit “ongoing.” A later on-chain review by Bitquery, reported by CoinDesk, counted 97 transactions from six wallets and a total of $3.42 million, everything the vault held.

The twist came after the money left. A copycat bot took $1.91 million, more than anyone else, then paid most of it to Ethereum block builders so its transactions would land first. Those builders received about $1.78 million. The wallet that first put the attack on chain, and a second wallet it funded, kept about $520,000.

How the Attack Emptied the Vault

sBOLD is a savings vault built by K3 Capital on top of Liquity V2. Users deposit BOLD, a dollar stablecoin, and the vault spreads it across Liquity’s stability pools to earn interest. In return they get sBOLD shares, whose price should track how much BOLD the vault holds.

The attackers found a gap in that pricing. They deposited BOLD, sent in a slice of wrapped ether (WETH) that the share price at first ignored, then called a function that sold that ether for BOLD, which did count. The share price jumped, they cashed out at the higher value, and they ran the same loop several times inside one transaction, each time pulling out other depositors’ BOLD.

Blockaid’s first alert described a flash loan of wstETH and a self-liquidation of a Liquity loan, known as a trove, into the stability pools. Bitquery checked every trove event on all three of Liquity’s markets during the drain. Loans were opened and closed, but none was liquidated. In each round, the attacker sent the WETH into the vault itself.

So the difference is simple: this was not a liquidation trick. It was an accounting trick. The vault undercounted what it held, sold shares too cheap, then let the same people redeem them after the missing value appeared.

A Copycat Bot Won the Race

The first drain did not come from the wallet that wrote the attack. Bitquery found that this wallet, 0xdc0e, deployed the exploit at 12:14 UTC, 11 minutes before anyone used it. A second wallet, 0x2324, copied the contract, swapped in its own address and hit the vault first. The original wallet’s first drain landed 24 seconds later.

Then the bots arrived. One automated trader sent 57 of the 97 drain transactions and pulled out $1.91 million, or 56% of the stolen funds. To stay first in line it paid block builders, starting at 12.5 ETH and rising to 44 ETH for a single block near the end. Titan built most of those blocks, with BuilderNet, Ultrasound and Quasar taking the rest.

The $1.78 million is what builders were paid, not what they necessarily kept, because they also pay validators to publish their blocks. Bitquery found no sign the builders knew what the transactions were doing. On Wednesday the MEV race, the fight to profit from transaction order, got so sharp that most of the hack never stayed with the people who started it.

Where the Stolen Funds Went

Together, the block builders and the copycat bot’s payout wallet kept 59% of the money. The original attacker and the wallet it funded took about $520,000.

Bitquery followed that smaller share off Ethereum. The attacker sent 162 ETH to three THORChain vaults with no memo, so the chain does not say where the funds were meant to go. Another 129 ETH, net of refunds, went through Maya Protocol, a THORChain fork, with memos that asked for Bitcoin at five addresses. By 15:30 UTC, two of those addresses had received 3.10 BTC between them. The other three had received nothing when the firm checked at 16:14 UTC.

ETH cannot be frozen in transit the way a bank transfer can. Any recovery now depends on an exchange intercepting the coins, or on THORChain acting on deposits that name no destination.

What K3 Capital and Liquity Said

K3 Capital posted on X at 13:08 UTC, 35 minutes after the drain ended:

“We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused.”

The firm has not published a loss figure, a cause or a plan for depositors. By then the vault held almost no BOLD.

Liquity replied less than an hour later:

“We’re aware of malicious activity affecting sBOLD, a vault built and run independently by @k3_capital. Do not deposit into sBOLD until further notice. Liquity V2 is NOT affected. We’re supporting K3 and will share updates.”

That split matters. Liquity’s core contracts kept running as normal. The weak point was how a third-party vault priced its own shares.

Background: sBOLD, Liquity and a Year-Old Audit

K3 Capital has built on-chain products since 2021. sBOLD was pitched as a hands-off savings account for BOLD in Liquity’s stability pools, and as a token other DeFi protocols can plug into. It sat on top of Liquity, not inside it, with adjustable parts that included its price logic.

ChainSecurity audited the vault in May 2025 and flagged a way to extract value by getting uncounted collateral into the vault, swapping it into BOLD and redeeming at a higher price. The auditor said “the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations has been mitigated” in a later version of the code. It is still unknown whether Wednesday’s attack used a related weakness, whether those fixes were deployed, or whether another gap was involved. K3 Capital has not said.

The message is clear: a yield vault can be emptied even when the protocol underneath it holds. The next thing to watch is a post-mortem from K3, a path for depositors, and whether any of the ETH in THORChain and Maya comes back.