At the end of July 2026, one of the most closely watched funds in global markets lost roughly three quarters of its assets in a matter of days. Situational Awareness, the artificial intellige
At the end of July 2026, one of the most closely watched funds in global markets lost roughly three quarters of its assets in a matter of days. Situational Awareness, the artificial intelligence fund founded by former OpenAI researcher Leopold Aschenbrenner, was forced to sell its entire public equity book to Ken Griffin's Citadel at a discount after prime brokers issued margin calls it could not meet.
The story matters to crypto readers for reasons that go well beyond schadenfreude at a leveraged blow-up in another asset class. The collapse ran on mechanics that anyone who traded through 2022 will recognise instantly, it involves a figure whose career began inside the FTX orbit, and it arrived in the same weeks that Bitcoin quietly broke its correlation with the AI trade. Several crypto-native companies are now carrying AI infrastructure risk directly on their balance sheets.
Aschenbrenner is a German investor and former AI researcher, born in 2001 or 2002 to parents who were both doctors, and educated at the John F. Kennedy School in Berlin. He entered Columbia University at 15 and graduated as valedictorian in 2021 at the age of 19, with a degree in economics and mathematics-statistics.
His early career included a stint at the FTX Future Fund, the philanthropic arm of Sam Bankman-Fried's exchange, where he helped run a charitable operation from the Bahamas. He then joined OpenAI's Superalignment team, the group tasked with controlling systems more capable than humans.
OpenAI dismissed him in April 2024 over an alleged information leak. Aschenbrenner disputes that account. He has said he shared a largely non-confidential planning document with outside researchers for feedback, and that his dismissal followed tensions over warnings he had raised about the company's security practices. OpenAI has said those concerns were unrelated to his departure.
In June 2024 he published "Situational Awareness: The Decade Ahead," a 165-page essay arguing that artificial general intelligence was arriving faster than almost anyone understood, and that the resulting demand for compute, energy and hardware would be historic. The essay became required reading across Silicon Valley. The following month, he turned it into a fund of the same name.
The trade was the essay. If AI capability scaling continued, then semiconductors, memory, data centres and power infrastructure were the bottleneck, and owning that bottleneck with leverage was the highest-conviction expression of the thesis. Backers included Stripe co-founders Patrick and John Collison, former GitHub CEO Nat Friedman and investor Daniel Gross. Jane Street was also an investor. The Wall Street Journal reported gains of more than 1,000% since inception.
Reported peak assets vary by source. CNBC put the fund's high-water mark at around $45 billion, while other reporting has cited roughly $20 billion in assets under management at peak. Either figure represents an extraordinary amount of capital for a manager who had never run money before founding the fund at 22.
The unwind ran over roughly two weeks in late July.
The fund's concentrated positions in AI infrastructure names, reported to include SK Hynix, CoreWeave, Nebius, Micron and Bloom Energy, fell between 35% and 47% during the month. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index dropped 28.6% from its 22 June peak as investors began questioning whether hyperscaler capital expenditure could ever generate adequate returns. A separate short position against software stocks reportedly went against the fund at the same time, compounding the damage from both directions.
Then the leverage did what leverage does. Reports put the fund's gearing at as much as 400%. At four times leverage, a 25% decline in the underlying positions is mathematically sufficient to erase an investor's entire equity contribution. The positions fell considerably further than 25%.
Prime brokers Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and Bank of America issued margin calls. The fund attempted several escape routes: a capital raise letter to existing investors, discussions with lenders, and negotiations with Millennium Management and Jane Street Group. According to reporting in the Financial Times, all of them failed. Citadel stepped in and bought the entire public book at a discount.
Assets fell from roughly $45 billion to around $10 billion. Reporting since suggests the fund may still be forced to liquidate further holdings.
There is a revealing postscript. Once Citadel had absorbed the position, the Nasdaq gained 3.30% and the semiconductor index rose sharply. Much of the late-July decline in AI infrastructure names had been the market pricing in a large, visible, forced seller. Removing him removed the discount.
The timing was unusual in one further respect: Aschenbrenner married Avital Balwit, chief of staff to Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei, in California the same weekend the fund was being unwound.
Three reasons, in ascending order of importance.
The first is that this is a familiar story with different tickers. A young quantitatively gifted manager builds a totalising thesis about the future, expresses it through extreme concentration and heavy leverage, produces spectacular returns that attract enormous capital, and then discovers that leverage is symmetrical. Crypto has run this experiment repeatedly. The specific detail that closes the circle is that Aschenbrenner's first significant job was at the FTX Future Fund, and that Jane Street, where Bankman-Fried himself trained, appears in this story both as an investor and as a failed rescue counterparty.
The comparison should not be pushed too far. There is no allegation of fraud, no customer funds, no missing assets. Situational Awareness appears to have been a legitimate fund that took a directional view and lost, which is a categorically different thing from what happened at FTX. But the underlying behavioural pattern, that of narrative conviction plus leverage minus risk management, is the same one that has cost crypto investors more money than any hack.
The second is that the mechanics are identical to a liquidation cascade. Concentrated leveraged longs, a price decline, a margin call, a forced seller who must sell into a falling market, and a well-capitalised buyer waiting to take the other side at a discount. Crypto traders watch this happen on-chain and on exchange liquidation feeds constantly. On 13 July, when the Kospi fell 8.95% and SK Hynix dropped 15.37% in its worst session on record, $253 million in leveraged crypto positions were force-liquidated in parallel, with long positions accounting for 76% of the total. Same physics, different venue.
The third, and most consequential, is what crypto did not do.
For most of 2026, crypto traded as a high-beta expression of the AI trade. It rose when chip stocks rallied and fell when they slipped. That relationship broke in July, and it broke twice inside five sessions.
When roughly $797 billion came off the largest US technology stocks in a single Thursday session in late July, $Bitcoin barely moved. On 29 July, as Asian equities suffered one of their worst two-day stretches of the year and SK Hynix fell nearly a fifth despite growing quarterly profit more than sixfold, Bitcoin rose about 1% to $63,800. Ether added 1% to $1,899, XRP gained 2% to $1.07, and Solana held around $73. When Citadel absorbed the Situational Awareness book and AI infrastructure names rebounded sharply, crypto markets were largely unmoved in the other direction as well.
Across July as a whole, Ether gained 16.29% and Bitcoin 5.61%, while the AI infrastructure complex was being repriced downward.
The interpretation matters. One reading is that Bitcoin is regaining independence as an asset class, driven now by rate expectations, ETF flows and its own regulatory calendar rather than by sentiment toward Nvidia's supply chain. Analysts increasingly describe crypto as behaving like a liquidity sponge, expanding and contracting with global money supply and real rates rather than with any individual equity narrative. Research has attributed roughly 45% of weekly Bitcoin price movement in 2026 to ETF flows alone.
A more cautious reading is that two weeks is not a trend, and that decoupling claims have been made and abandoned repeatedly since 2020. The honest position is that the correlation has weakened materially and visibly, and that the next genuine risk-off event will test whether that is structural or coincidental.
This is where the story stops being an analogy and becomes direct exposure. A significant portion of the Bitcoin mining industry has spent two years converting itself into AI infrastructure, and it is now priced accordingly.
Miners owned the two things AI companies most needed: large contracted power capacity and physical data centre real estate. After the 2024 halving compressed mining economics, pivoting that capacity toward high-performance computing and AI hosting became the sector's dominant strategy. Leasing activity grew from 95 MW in the first quarter of 2026 to 1.19 GW in the second, with a further 928 MW announced in the third quarter through 27 July, bringing the year-to-date total to 2.21 GW. TeraWulf signed a $19 billion lease with Anthropic. Hut 8, IREN and Applied Digital accounted for the bulk of capacity signed this year.
That pivot worked in both directions. When AI infrastructure sentiment cracked in July, these names fell harder than the underlying asset they were named after. IREN dropped 33% over a month, TeraWulf 38% and Applied Digital 36%, against a 13% decline in the broader Global X Data Center and Digital Infrastructure ETF. Over July specifically, MARA Holdings fell 18.14%, IREN 19.40% and Riot Platforms 23.08%, while spot Bitcoin gained. Their beta figures explain the sensitivity: IREN carries a five-year monthly beta of 4.28, TeraWulf 4.26 and Applied Digital 5.68.
Analysts at KBW made the sharpest observation about what was actually repriced. The selloff, they argued, primarily removed the value that markets had assigned to future AI and HPC leases rather than repricing completed projects. In other words, the market stopped paying for pipeline and started paying only for signed contracts with creditworthy tenants. KBW downgraded Core Scientific to Market Perform and flagged a new category of danger it called model-layer risk: if an AI lab tenant fails to meet expectations, the developer holding the lease is exposed.
CoreWeave, one of Aschenbrenner's reported core positions, illustrates the whole loop. It began life as an Ethereum mining operation before becoming an AI cloud provider, attempted a merger with Bitcoin miner Core Scientific that failed, and has since fallen 61% from its mid-year high of $187, shedding roughly $33 billion in market value in six weeks amid short-seller criticism and doubts about GAAP profitability. A company born from crypto mining became the most crowded position in the AI trade and then one of its largest casualties.
